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Kiel University,
University of Southern Denmark
May 2018
Abstract
Subsidising investment in lagging regions is an important regional policy instru-
ment in many countries. Some argue that this instrument is not specific enough
to concentrate the aid towards the regions that are lagging behind most, because
investment subsidies benefit capital owners who might reside elsewhere, possibly in
very rich places. Checking under which conditions this is true is thus highly policy
relevant. The present paper studies regional investment subsidies in a multiregional
neoclassical dynamic framework. We set up a model with trade in heterogeneous
goods, with a perfectly integrated financial capital market and sluggish adjustment
of regional capital stocks. Consumers and investors act under perfect foresight. We
derive the equilibrium system, show how to solve it, and simulate actual European
regional subsidies in computational applications. We find that the size of the welfare
gains depends on the portfolio distribution held by the households. If households
own diversified asset portfolios, we find that the supported regions gain roughly the
amounts that are allocated to them in the form of investment subsidies. If they
only own local capital stocks, a part of the money is lost through the drop in share
prices. From the point of view of total welfare, the subsidy is not efficient. It can
lead to a welfare loss for the EU as a whole and definitely leads to welfare losses in
the rest of the world, from where investment ows to the supported EU regions.
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1. Introduction
Subsidising investment in lagging regions is the most important regional policy instrument in the
EU as well as within European countries (European Union, 2017). Some argue that this instrument is
not specific enough to concentrate the aid towards the regions that are lagging behind most, because
the benefits trickle down to other places and little is left to the regions to be supported themselves
(Dupont and Martin, 2006). There are potentially two channels that could transmit the benefits
to places that were not intended to be supported in the first place: trade and the capital market.
Through the trade channel the demand impulse generated by a subsidy partly spreads out to the rest
of the world. A repercussion on the capital market comes from the fact that subsidies affect stock
prices. They make capital in the supported regions more abundant and thus press its market value
down. If people in the supported regions happen to own these capital stocks they suffer from an
asset loss. Eventually the lagging regions might benefit less than if they got the money directly in a
lump sum fashion. The policy issue to be answered in this paper is to check under which conditions
this statement holds true.
From the theory point of view, investment subsidies are mainly seen as an instrument to support
lagging regions and raise economic growth (Barro and Sala–i–Martin, 1995). As a support instrument,
they can be a more efficient policy than alternatives, for example employment subsidies (Fuest and
Huber, 2000). At the same time, investment subsidies can play a role in the international tax
competition by increasing the incentives for firms to invest and to settle in certain locations (Baldwin
et al., 2003). It is in this context of capital mobility between regions that questions about capital
ownership, interregional distribution of income and resulting welfare effects of investment subsidies
can arise.
In a static model incorporating agglomeration externalities and firm mobility, Dupont and Martin
(2006) show that regional capital subsidies may increase inequality, hurting the poor regions. Their
framework, however, misses several important features of the actual policies. First, in practice subsi-
dies are supporting new investment projects and not the existing capital stock. Second, investment is
a dynamic phenomenon resulting from intertemporal trade-offs, which cannot be reasonably reflected
in a static framework. A dynamic approach is therefore needed to study the impact of investment
subsidies in an appropriate way.
Regarding the first point, it has to be stressed that subsidising investment and subsidising the
user cost of capital is not the same. The impact is very different. The main point is that subsidising
the user cost of capital favours both, owners of the existing stock as well as asset owners everywhere
in the world earning a higher interest on their asset. Subsidising investment potentially may harm
rather than benefit owners of the existing stock. The stock becomes less scarce, when investments
get cheaper, and thus its market value drops. If the subsidy is small in comparison to the world stock
of assets such that its impact on the world real interest rate is negligible, the loss of stock value may
dominate.
The effects of regional subsidies (in particular, the EU Structural Funds) have been widely studied
empirically. This literature includes the results of simulation models (Capello and Fratesi, 2012;
Brandsma et al., 2015; Garau and Lecca, 2015; Ribeiro et al., 2018), case studies (Huggins, 1998;
Lolos, 1998) and econometric models (Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 2008; Mohl and Hagen, 2010; de Castris
and Pellegrini, 2012; Cerqua and Pellegrini, 2014). The findings from econometric studies and case
studies are in general mixed, due to the use of different methods, varying sample sizes and time
periods, and range from no significant effect of regional funds to large and positive impacts on the
supported regions (Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 2008).
Given these uncertainties, it is worthwhile to study the effects of the investment subsidies with
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the help of simulation models, where the results can be clearly traced back to the shocks and the
model assumptions. A modern approach suitable to study such questions is the dynamic spatial
computable general equilibrium modelling framework (Bröcker and Korzhenevych, 2013). Dynamic
spatial CGE models are rare and usually recursive, meaning that static solutions in each period
are connected with each other using ad-hoc dynamic transition rules. In contrast, the approach in
this paper is to apply a fully forward-looking model, which allows consistent saving and investment
decisions and a proper welfare analysis.
The present paper thus studies regional investment subsidies in a multiregional neoclassical dy-
namic framework. We set up a model with trade in heterogeneous goods, with a perfectly integrated
financial capital market and sluggish adjustment of regional capital stocks. Consumers and investors
act under perfect foresight. We derive the equilibrium system, show how to solve it, and simulate
regional policies in a computational application. We compare the welfare gain generated by an invest-
ment subsidy with a hypothetical welfare gain that households would obtain if they got the subsidy
as a lump sum transfer.
The aims of the paper are the following. First, we show that a spatial forward-looking CGE model
is an operational tool that can be used in policy applications. Second, in terms of policy application
we are able to answer several questions about the investment subsidies: Is this instrument effective
(does is produce a positive net welfare effect)? Do target regions gain more through a subsidy than
through a a lump-sum transfer? What are the costs of the subsidy in terms of global welfare?
The paper starts with a non-technical introduction into the model in Section 2, followed by a
technical explanation in Section 3. Section 4 introduces investment subsidies, Section 5 is a brief
outline of the solution technique (leaving lots of technical details aside). Section 6 explains the
calibration, Section 7 presents the simulation results, and Section 8 concludes.
2. Non-technical model description
The model to be presented is a dynamic spatial computable general equilibrium (DSpCGE) model
for a closed system of regions. This system covers the whole world in our empirical application, while
the policy under study is executed by just a small part of the world, the EU. By embedding it into
the world economy, open economy repercussions are fully taken account of. The specification of the
production and household sectors as well as of the goods markets is close to an earlier static model
(Bröcker, 1998) that has been widely applied under the brand name CGEurope in transport policy
evaluation (Bröcker et al., 2010; Korzhenevych and Bröcker, 2009).
Agents of the economy are firms and households. The state is not modelled as an own sector.
State production is subsumed under the production sector; state consumption is subsumed under
the household sector. The basic setup is an open-economy version of the Ramsey optimal savings
model, combined with an investment adjustment costs framework (Abel and Blanchard, 1986). Thus,
both, households and firms make intertemporal decisions and have perfect foresight.
Two types of goods are distinguished in the model: local and tradable. Local goods can only
be sold within the region of production, while tradables are sold everywhere in the world, including
the own region. Identical firms located in the region produce output by combining capital, effective
amount of labour service, local goods, and a composite of tradable goods (coming from all regions)
using a Cobb-Douglas (CD) technology. The composite of tradables is defined as a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) index good. Homogeneous gross output serves a double purpose:
first, it is one-to-one transformed into the local good (without a price mark-up), and secondly, it
is used as the only input in the production of a variety of tradable goods under increasing returns
to scale. The market for local goods is perfectly competitive, while monopolistic competition in
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Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) style prevails in the tradables market. Firms produce not one single, but a
whole bundle of product varieties. The number of varieties supplied by the region is endogenously
determined by the free entry condition requiring market entry or exit until firms can just cover their
respective fixed cost by the monopolistic price mark-up.
Firms decide at any moment about both, production and investment. Investment needs a com-
posite investment good as an input, which is assumed to be a CD composite of two types of goods:
locals and the composite of tradables. The investment good can however not be transformed into
gross investment one-to-one. There are adjustment costs of investment, in addition to the investment
itself; these costs are assumed to increase, if the capital growth rate increases. Following the literature
(see e.g. Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1995)) we assume quadratic adjustment costs. By introducing
this assumption, we want to rule out an implausible outcome of the basic open-economy version of
the Ramsey model, where the adjustment of capital stocks is done through an instantaneous jump
to the new locations. The existence of adjustment costs implies that the stock of capital in a region
has a stock price that in general differs from the price of the investment good, by which the stock is
built up. This leads to a regional investment function, known as Tobin’s q-theory, making regional
investment depend on the regional stock price of capital.
Households in a region are regarded to represent the present as well as all future generations.
Hence, they maximize utility over an infinite time horizon subject to the constraint, that the present
value of their consumption expenditures does not exceed the present value of their wage income plus
the value of their actual shares in the world’s stock of capital. Utility is given by a an intertemporal
CES function. The consumption composite is constructed using a nested CD-CES function, which
is the same as the one used to construct the composite investment good. The income share not used
for consumption is saving, that is the per unit of time increase in the value of assets held by the
households. The asset total held by all households in the economy equals the total stock value in the
economy at any moment.
Households take the wage rate paid per unit of labour service as given. Each individual is assumed
to provide one unit of labour service inelastically. The population is assumed to be immobile and
constant. The effective labour is assumed to grow at a constant rate. This is the assumption of
Harrod neutral technical progress. However, as we will show, the steady-state growth rate is
scaled up by a term that reflects the presence of an additional source of productivity growth on the
dynamic equilibrium path, the expanding variety of tradables. This allows us to link our model to
the literature on semi-endogenous growth pioneered by Jones (1998).
In addition to the distinction of goods, factors, firms, and households by location, the spatial
dimension comes in through the costs for goods movement depending on geography. The total trade
costs for goods to be delivered from one region to another is assumed to amount to a share in
the traded value. The way trade costs are modelled resembles — but is not identical with — the
“iceberg” approach (Samuelson, 1954). Following an earlier static model (Bröcker, 1998), we assume
that trade costs for goods arriving in a region are paid to a zero-profit “transport service”, doing the
job by consuming composite tradables, composed in the same way as the composite tradables used
by households and firms.
Regional policy is introduced by assuming that in a lagging region the government rebates to the
investor a certain share of the investment cost. This subsidy is financed by collecting a proportional
labour income tax with a uniform rate raised in all regions of a jurisdiction executing the policy (the
EU in our application).
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3. The formal model
The model is set up in continuous time t in years, running from zero to infinity. To avoid
notational clutter, we usually suppress both, the time argument and the regional subscript. At time
t = 0 the policy intervention is announced and its implementation starts at the same point in time.
In the calibration, t = 0 corresponds to the year 2011 that the calibration data are collected for. As
the model is non-monetary, the unit of account is arbitrary. We choose e as unit of account. At
t = 0 one e in the model coincides with one e in the data. The arbitrary diachronic movement of
the unit of account is chosen in such a way that the nominal interest rate is at all times equal to the
households’ time preference rate ρ, a model parameter that is equal across regions and constant over
time. This is just for notational convenience. The real interest rate and thus also the inflation rate
are endogenous.
3.1. Firms
Due to the CD technology and perfect competition on the input markets, firms with sales value
M spend αM for labour, γM for non-tradables and ηM for composites of tradables. The remaining
part βM goes as remuneration for the service of capital in goods production to the shareholders
(α + β + γ + η = 1).
The mill price is
pm = wα(βM/K)β(pm)γ(pd)η, (1)
where w denotes the wage rate, pd is the composite tradables price and K is the real capital stock.
Firms can use part of the output to produce varieties of tradables under Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic
competition, to sell them at sales price ps, that customers in the world (including the region itself)
are willing to pay. By choice of unit the mill price of tradables is also pm. The mill price either equals
the sales price or exceeds it. If the firm sells tradables, then the mill price and sales price must be
equal. If the mill price exceeds the sales price sales of tradables are zero. The firm would produce
only for the non-tradables market. This leads to the complementarity (with tradables supply denoted
S)
S ≥ 0, pm ≥ ps, S(pm − ps) = 0. (2)
The regional population is assumed to be immobile and constant at L̄. The effective amount of
labour input is assumed to grow at an exogenous rate of technological progress, ξ̃, i.e.
Lr(t) = L̄ exp(ξ̃t) (3)
Firms do not only produce, they also invest. For adding the gross investment I to the existing
capital stock they need I(1 + (ζ/2)(I/K)) units of investment goods. The “first unit” of investment
goods is transformed to installed capital one-to-one. If capital grows, however, more than one unit
of the investment good per unit of new capital installed is required, and the input requirement per
unit of new capital gets larger with a larger growth rate. This increase is the stronger, the larger
the adjustment cost parameter ζ. For the sake of simplicity both, the consumption bundle and the
investment good are the same, a CD composite of non-tradables and tradables, with expenditure
shares ε and 1− ε, respectively, and with price pc. We thus have investment costs as
J = pcI
(
1 +
ζ
2
I
K
)
. (4)
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Capital depreciates at a rate δ p.a. Thus
K̇ = I − δK. (5)
The shares in the capital stock can be traded at unit price q on the market, and firms choose
investment I maximising qI − J . The first order condition is
I/K = q/p
c − 1
ζ
. (6)
q/pc is called “Tobin’s q” in the literature. According to (6) real capital cannot “jump” between
regions as in static NEG models with mobile capital. It’s growth rate is finite. Capital grows the
faster, the larger is Tobin’s q and the smaller is the adjustment cost parameter.
For using the capital stock, firms have to pay a rental rate to their shareholders that is equal
to the marginal value product of capital. The marginal value product has two components, one
is the marginal value product in production of goods already mentioned. Per unit of capital it is
βM/K. The other is the marginal investment cost reduction brought about by an extra unit of
capital installed. According to equation (4) it amounts to
− ∂J
∂K
= pc
ζ
2
(
I
K
)2
.
Thus the rental rate is
v = βM/K + pc ζ
2
(
I
K
)2
. (7)
3.2. Consumers
Consumers maximise discounted utility
U =
∫ ∞
0
u(C(t)) exp(−ρt) dt
subject to the flow budget constraint
Ȧ = αM + ρA− C, (8)
with asset value A, real consumption C and nominal consumption C = Cpc. Real consumption C
is a CD composite of local and tradable goods with respective expenditure shares ε and 1 − ε. Its
composite price is thus
pc = (pm)ε(pd)1−ε. (9)
The present value utility U is characterized by a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution θ:
u(C) = C
1−1/θ − 1
1− 1/θ
.
This is a concave optimisation problem. The first order condition requires the marginal utility as
of today to be equal — up to a constant factor — to the price as of today, i.e. the future price
discounted to today. Thus C(t)−1/θ exp(−ρt) ∝ pc(t) exp(−ρt). Solving for C yields
C = m(pc)1−θ, (10)
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with m varying across regions, but being constant over time. m is an endogenous variable to be
determined in the solution of the system. It must be such that, when starting with a certain asset
A(0) in t = 0, the asset trajectory stays within certain bounds.
3.3. Trade
Consumers and firms buy a CES composite (with an elasticity of substitution σ) of tradable
varieties produced everywhere and sold under conditions of Dixit-Stilglitz monopolistic competi-
tion. The composite is consumed, used as a production input and as a component of the composite
investment good. It is also used to produce the transport service. Transport cost is added to the
sales price psr leading to the inclusive price p
s
rΘrs in destination s for a good coming from origin r.
Here it is assumed that nominal transport cost for a given origin-destination pair is a fixed share of
the nominal value of the good, valued at mill price. We call this the “modified iceberg assumption”.
It differs from the standard iceberg assumption in that we assume the composite — not the variety
itself — to be used for the transport service of an individual variety. This is more plausible than the
often criticised iceberg assumption, though the results differ only slightly.
From these consideration follows the trade equation (with explicit regional subscripts, but the
time argument still suppressed)
Trs =
Sr(p
s
rΘrs)
−σDs∑
r′ Sr′(p
s
r′Θr′s)
−σ . (11)
D is demand including demand for the transport service. It is in other words demand for tradables
valued at c.i.f. prices, which is
D = (1− ε)(C + J) + ηM. (12)
The CES form of demand implies a composite price of tradables in the destination region s
pds = ψ
(∑
r
Sr(p
s
rΘrs)
1−σ
)1/(1−σ)
. (13)
ψ is an arbitrary scaler. The choice does not affect any result, but it offers a degree of freedom to
choose the average level of prices.
3.4. Equilibrium
Labour market equilibrium requires
αM = wL. (14)
Equilibrium on the market for non-tradables requires the value of non-tradables (M − S) to equal
the demand value of non-tradables, which is intermediate (γM) plus final (ε(C + J)) demand. Thus
we must have
M − S = ε(C + J) + γM. (15)
Equilibrium in the tradables market requires the value of supply Sr in the region to equal the value
of demand of all regions for tradables from region r, i.e.
Sr =
∑
s
Trs. (16)
Finally, equilibrium on the market for shares in capital stocks requires shares in all stocks to earn
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the common interest rate ρ implying ρq = v − δq + q̇, or solving for q̇,
q̇ = (ρ+ δ)q − v. (17)
This is the non-arbitrage condition implied by a perfect frictionless asset market. In equilibrium it
must also be guaranteed that the asset total
∑
r Ar in the entire economy equals the total value of
capital stocks
∑
r qrKr. One can show that this condition automatically holds for all times, if it holds
for one point in time. This is Walras’ law.
Equations (1) to (17) give us 17 equations to determine the 17 unknowns pm, ps, J , K̇, I, v, L,
pc, Ȧ, C, T , D, pd, w, M , S and q̇. Three of these equations ((5), (8) and (17)) are differential
equations to determine K̇, Ȧ and q̇, respectively, the others are algebraic to determine the remaining
14 unknowns. We thus have a differential algebraic equation (DAE) system to find the time path of
all endogenous variables. It is however not yet complete. Two points are open: first, what are the
boundary conditions for the three dynamic variables, and second, how to determine m.
As to the first point: capital stock is inherited and thus given at t = 0,
K(0) = K0. (18)
Its level has to be calibrated by benchmark year observations. Households also inherit their respective
assets, giving the boundary conditions for A,
Ar(0) =
∑
s
Λrsqs(0)Ks(0), (19)
where parameter Λrs gives the share of region r in the property of capital stock in region s at t = 0.
The parameter restrictions
∑
s Λrs = 1 ∀r guarantee that, at t = 0, the asset total in the entire
economy equals the total value of capital stocks.
The benchmark equilibrium is assumed to be a perfect foresight equilibrium. In such an equilib-
rium only the values of the assets matter, not the composition of the portfolios. This is because any
kind of asset a household can hold earns the same nominal interest. We have to be careful, however,
when we allow for unexpected shocks. Such a shock leads to revaluations of the capital stocks, and
this affects different households differently, if they do not all hold assets of identical composition. If
we compare time paths after a shock with a non-shock time path in welfare terms, start conditions
in real terms must be held unchanged between the paths. Otherwise we would allow wealth to rein
from heaven or disappear to nowhere. As prices, including the stock price q, change from one path
to the other, the same must in general hold for the assets held by the households. After a shock it
is not the nominal value of the asset, that has to be held unchanged, but the real stocks making up
the respective portfolio.
A third boundary condition is needed for q. It is given by the transversality condition of the
dynamic optimisation of firms: in the long run, the market value of a firm’s capital stock must
converge to zero, in present values,
lim
t→∞
K(t)q(t) exp(−ρt) = 0. (20)
As to the second point: for determining the vector m controlling the level of consumption we
exploit the transversality condition of the households’ optimisation problem saying that a household’s
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asset must have a present value zero in the long run, as already noted above,
lim
t→∞
A(t) exp(−ρt) = 0. (21)
This is intuitive: the level of consumption must be such that its present value just equals the asset
value at t = 0 plus the present value of all future labour income.
We now have just the right number of equations and boundary conditions to determine the
equilibrium. To be sure, this is just a hint at a good chance to be able to solve the model, no
existence proof. In particular, it is not obvious whether the transversality conditions make sure
that only one, not many trajectories would converge in the way required. It is known that under
perfect competition without externalities saddle path stability holds (Farmer, 1999), which is a kind
of local uniqueness condition, saying that any trajectory fulfilling the constraint has no other one in
its neighbourhood doing so as well, if the neighbourhood is chosen small enough. This result can
fail under increasing returns, but local properties around the steady state found in our numerical
experiments never show any such pathology. We highly trust in saddle path stability of the solution
of our model.
4. Evaluating investment subsidies
As mentioned we study two intervention scenarios: i) a subsidy for private investment costs
(“Subs”) and ii) a lump sum transfer (“Lump”). The lump sum transfer is not a regional policy
actually observed. It serves as a reference to see whether the subsidies exert a stronger influence than
what one achieves by transferring the money directly to the households in the supported regions.
The interventions come as unexpected shocks. The regional impact is evaluated by looking at the
Relative Equivalent Variation (REV) caused by this shock for the representative regional household.
REV is a welfare measure expressed as a percentage of consumption, based on an intuitive idea:
assume the shock did not happen, but you wanted to make the household as well off as it would be
with the shock in place, by increasing its consumption by a constant percentage for the entire future.
REV is the percentage doing it. Multiplied with the benchmark value of consumption, it is easily
converted into monetary terms.
Subsidising private investment means that, in the supported regions, the government rebates
to the investor a certain share of the investment cost. If the tax payer bears the share Γ of the
investment costs, investors maximise qI − (1− Γ)J rather than qI − J . This leads to a replacement
of (6) with
I/K =
q/
(
(1− Γ)pc
)
− 1
ζ
. (22)
The expression q/
(
(1− Γ)pc
)
can be understood as a subsidy-corrected Tobin’s q. The rental rate
in (7) becomes
v = βM/K + pc(1− Γ)ζ
2
(
I
K
)2
. (23)
Clearly, investments are the higher, the more they are subsidised, other things equal. It is
important to note, however, that the regional stock price drops down, because investors foresee the
subsidy to trigger more investment and thus to depress rental rates. To the best of our knowledge,
the literature is not aware of this effect.
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As a reference, we introduce a lump sum transfer Ωr, changing (8) to
Ȧ = Ω + (1− t)αM + ρA− C, (24)
where t is the labour tax rate to be explained below.
All policy interventions are financed by the EU. We let its budget be balanced at any time. Public
debt is not admitted. Therefore at any time the subsidies or transfers must be paid by taxes. We
assume a labour tax with a uniform rate within the EU. Elsewhere it is zero. The state budget
constraint then reads ∑
r
tr(αMr + ρAr) =
∑
r
ΓrJr, (25)
or in the transfer case ∑
r
tr(αMr + ρAr) =
∑
r
Ωr, (26)
with tax rate tr. Γr and Ωr follow an exogenous trajectory, while the tax rate is endogenous.
5. Solution
We start by showing constructively that there is a steady state where all variables grow at a
constant rate, though not all at the same rate. Assuming all variables to grow at a constant rate
leads to a linear equation system that can be solved for all growth rates. One gets in particular
K̂ = Î = ξ and q̂ = p̂c = v̂ = −ξ/θ with
ξ =
α(σ − ε)
βε+ ασ + γ − 1
ξ̃. (27)
ξ/θ is in other words the rate of deflation. Thus the real interest rate is ξ/θ+ ρ. All nominal values,
M , C, J , S, D, T , C and A grow at the rate (1 − 1/θ)ξ. The nominal wage per worker (not per
effective worker) grows at this rate as well. One may easily check that, given these rates, the prices
pm, ps and pd also grow at constant rates. ξ is the rate of real growth of consumption, capital and
investment. The fraction in (27) can be shown to be larger than one, if its denominator is positive,
what we assume. The inequalities
ασ + βε+ γ − 1 < ασ + β + γ − 1 = ασ − (α + η) < ασ − αε
prove the denominator to be less than the nominator, thus the fraction is larger than one. Positivity of
the nominator is guaranteed with any sensible choice of parameters. ασ ≥ 1 is already sufficient. The
labour share in the output value α is usually in the order of 1/3 and σ is suggested to be considerably
larger than 3, so that the condition is satisfied. If the denominator happened to approach zero, any
positive Harrod neutral technical progress, how small ever it may be, would let growth explode.
The condition that the denominator be strictly positive can be interpreted as the “no black hole
condition” in our context.
Real growth is faster in this economy than the rate of Harrod neutral technical progress, unlike
the standard Solow model, where both are the same. The deviation is due to the fact that in
our model there is an aggregate economies of scale effect. If the economy grows, product diversity
increases, which makes production and investment more productive and consumers more satisfied.
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The factor amplifying the rate of Harrod neutral technical progress gets larger, if σ gets smaller or
the share of tradables in production or consumption and investment gets larger.
To solve the model, we must at any point in time, with given dynamic state variables K, q and A,
solve a non-linear system to obtain the other 14 unknowns. Inserting the solution into the differential
equations (5), (8) and (17) then gives us a system of non-autonomous ordinary differential equations
in the state variables K, q and A of dimension 3n, that we can integrate over time. But there is
an obvious difficulty: m is in the beginning unknown, and one does not know where to start with
regard to the stock price vector q. The respective degrees of freedom are closed by the transversality
conditions (20) and (21).
An intuitive strategy is trying “forward shooting”. Though we do not apply it, its description
helps understanding the problem. One would start with a guess for q(0) and m and integrate forward
in time. Typically q and A would however diverge rapidly and the transversality conditions would
fail to hold. Then one would revise the initial guesses and would try again to hit the target. If e.g.
for some region qr(0) is chosen too high and thus escapes to heaven, one would reduce the initial
guess. Similarly, if the initial guess of mr is too high such that the household runs into a rapidly
increasing deficit, one would reduce the initial guess of mr.
Though intuitive, such a procedure does not work in practice. Variables escape extremely rapidly
from a stable path, even if they are chosen only slightly different from their correct (though unknown)
start values. Two fundamental tricks help to solve the system. First, the system is transformed in
such a way that it becomes autonomous (i.e. time does not appear as an argument in the DAE) and
converges to a stationary state. Second, the transversality conditions, that are difficult to handle
because of the limit operator, are replaced with boundary conditions for a point in finite time far
enough in the future, 50 years, say.
We make use of the fact that the system converges to a steady state. Though one cannot force it
to reach this steady state already in finite time, we can make sure by the boundary conditions that
it reaches the so-called saddle path of a system that linearly approximates the system to be solved
around the steady state. It thus comes close — in fact very close — to the true solution path in
finite time; for details see Bröcker and Korzhenevych (2013).
The mathematical problem to be solved is of the general form
ẋ = f(x,m),
where x ∈ R4n is the state vector with components A, K, q and L, each of length n. As m has also
length n there are 5n degrees of freedom. We have boundary conditions at t = 0 fixing initial values
for A, K and L , thus closing 3n degrees of freedom. 2n degrees of freedom are left to be closed
by transversality conditions (20) and (21), that are transformed to linear constraints in finite time.
For the non-linear solution we use a collocation method to solve two-point boundary value problems.
We use the matlab code bvp6c (Hale and Moore, 2008), a refinement of matlab’s original code
bvp4c (Shampine et al., 2005). The details of the solution procedure are described in Bröcker and
Korzhenevych (2013)
6. Data and calibration
6.1. Regional setup
The following calculations have been performed for two alternative aggregations. In the first
aggregation (Aggregation 1), the focus is on 16 NUTS2 regions in Poland, as well as Baltic states
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These regions receive a substantial amount of EU regional funding
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(see Table 3 below). Further regions include Germany, as well as aggregate regions for the other areas
of the EU and the rest of Europe and one “Rest of the world” region. In the second aggregation
(Aggregation 2), Poland is a single region and instead Bulgaria and Romania are disaggregated. The
two schemes cover 26 and 25 regions, respectively. For computational reasons we have to keep the
total number of regions limited. The comparison of the results from the two aggregations should
illustrate the robustness of the model with regard to changes in regional setting. Illustrating time
paths are plotted for a high subsidy case (Latvia), a low subsidy case (Germany) and for the rest of
world (ROW).
6.2. Data sources
Data on the amounts of money from the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund used to subsidise regional
private investment in the years 2007-2015 stem from DG Regio. These data are provided for NUTS2
regions. All subsidies to the private sector in each region have been added up to arrive at the total
amount of regional private investment subsidies.
Two pieces of information that are needed to identify the initial steady state are the values of
regional GDP and trade deficit in the benchmark (see below). The source of GDP data for NUTS2
European regions is Eurostat (2017). United Nations Statistics Division (2017b) data is used for
other regions in the model. International trade data stem from United Nations Statistics Division
(2017a). The base year for GDP and trade data is 2011.
The matrix of distance cost mark-ups is the aggregated version (with regional GDPs used as
weights) of the full matrix computed for the whole world. The parameters of the distance function
are estimated from a gravity model for international trade as in Bröcker et al. (2010). Land distances
were calculated using a global road network from OpenStreetMap (OpenStreetMap contributors
(2017)). Travel distances over see were purchased from AtoBviaC data provider. See to land distance
conversion rates were taken from Hummels (1999).
6.3. Calibration
Table 1 lists the assumed values of elasticities and share parameters. Cobb-Douglas parameters
are calculated from the aggregate GTAP data (Narayanan et al., 2012). The adjustment cost param-
eter ζ is chosen taking account of the implications for the value of Tobin’s q and the convergence
speed. The econometric estimates of Tobin’s q (e.g. Blanchard et al. (1993)) usually do not exceed
1.5, while the plausible speed of convergence for the capital stock should not be higher than 0.05 per
year. With the chosen parametrization, both criteria are fulfilled for our model.
Parameter α β η γ ε δ σ θ ζ ξ ρ
Value 0.24 0.19 0.29 0.28 0.60 0.05 12.0 0.80 6.0 0.02 0.025
Table 1: Preference and technology parameters
The scaling factor ψ is set such that the initial price level of the local goods in the rest of the world
is equal to 1. The depreciation rate is set at the value 0.05 per year. The elasticity of substitution
among brands of tradables is set at 12. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is commonly
assumed to lie between 0 and 1. We choose the value of 0.8. The rate of growth of the efficient
labour stock ξ̃ is calibrated according to (27), where the real growth rate of consumption ξ is set at
2% per year. The rate of time preference, ρ, is calibrated assuming the real interest rate of 5% per
year.
In addition to distance costs, the iceberg costs in the model include international trade barriers.
These are calibrated such that international trade flows for any pair of countries in the benchmark
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equilibrium coincide with the observations. Interregional trade flows are calibrated based on the
steady-state solution of the model as in Bröcker et al. (2010).
It remains to specify the initial values for effective labour, assets and capital. This is done by
introducing an appropriate number of constraints that have to hold at t = 0, as shown by the
following equations. All variables in the equations have to be thought of as evaluated at the initial
steady state. For assets and effective labour, the constraints force the solution to reproduce certain
data. First, L is calibrated such that the observed GDP Ȳ is reproduced in the model. Given the
model’s GDP Y = (α + β)M and wL = αM this gives the calibration equation
Ȳ =
α + β
α
wL
for L. Note that L is effective labour incorporating regional labour productivity. The wage is also
wage per unit of effective labour. As long as we are not interested in wage per worker, no data on
labour input is required.
As to assets, the steady state growth rate of A means Ȧ = A(1 − 1/θ)ξ. Inserting this into (8)
and rearranging yields
A = Y
1
ρ− (1− 1/θ)ξ
(
C
Y
− α
α + β
)
. (28)
We can infer on C/Y from the trade surplus fulfilling the familiar national accounts identity S−D =
Y − C − J following from adding (12) plus (15). Dividing by Y and substituting trade data S̄ and
D̄ for S and D yields the calibration equation for C/Y ,
S̄ − D̄
Y
= 1− C
Y
− J
Y
, (29)
which then is inserted into (28) to obtain A. On the sub-national level we do not have the trade data.
We therefore impose the constraint (29) on the national level for countries with regional subdivision
and apply uniform ratios C/Y across regions of the same nation.
Finally, no extra data is needed for calibrating capital stocks. Instead, capital stocks follow from
the assumption that the benchmark solution is a steady state. Using equations (5) to (7) and (17)
as well as the steady state growth rates from Section 5, one can derive the calibration equation
Y = φpcK
with a positive constant φ only depending on parameters that are uniform across regions and constant
over time (i.e. the small type Greek letters). We omit the rather unwieldy expression. With data on
capital stocks one could dispense with the steady state assumption and calibrate a non-steady state
start point instead. But we neither have such data, nor would we feel the resulting time paths to be
terribly convincing. Regions would converge fairly rapidly towards their respective steady states, a
pattern that we actually do not see in the data. We simply assume that these adjustments already
took place before t = 0.
Subsidies and transfers are assumed to stay in place forever. This schedule is common knowledge
for all agents in the model, once the subsidy plan is announced, and it is taken as 100% credible by
the public. To make the subsidy and the transfer scenarios comparable we design them in a way
that makes the nominal amount that the central state pays to a supported region equal under both
settings. The point of departure are the amounts of funds available for subsidies, which are known
from the actual data (as a total amount for a period of 8 years, see Section 6.2). These nominal
13
amounts are first distributed along the steady-state time path of the model such that the steady-state
growth rate of transfer value is fulfilled and are then further extrapolated into the future. This gives
the exogenous levels of Zrt. As a consequence, if the amount of transfers for each year is divided by
the corresponding value of gross investment, the resulting ratio is constant along the steady-state
time path. This constant ratio represents the subsidy rate Γr, constant over time. Thus Ωrt = ΓrJ̄rt,
where bar indicates the benchmark level.
7. Simulation results
Our benchmark is a world without any policy intervention. At t = 0 the introduction of a subsidy
or a transfer comes as a full surprise. Subsidy announcement leads to updating of the present value
of capital installed , quantified by the stock price q, and thus also of assets held by the households.
Thus A and q jump at the day of announcement (Figure 1).
The time path of the capital stock illustrates that the subsidy pushes investments in the subsidised
regions up, and that this push is largest in the beginning. Capital stock accumulates above the initial
benchmark level and converges to a new steady state level (Figure 1, upper panel). If we had lower
adjustment cost we would observe a stronger concentration of high investments in the subsidised
regions immediately after the shock. When investment jumps up due to support, the trade surplus
in the supported regions goes down or trade deficit up (Figure 1, bottom panel).
In the case of the lump sum transfer, there is virtually no reaction on the capital market; prices
are largely unaffected. However, the incomes of the households go up in the supported regions, and
thus their consumption and savings go up. Additional assets are accumulated and the trade deficit
is permanently larger (Figure 2).
As the true initial distribution of the assets is unknown, Table 2 shows regional welfare effects
for two extreme variations of these policy scenarios, labelled “global portfolio” and “local portfo-
lio”. “Global portfolio” means that portfolio compositions of all households are identical. Thus each
household owns a perfectly diversified portfolio of all assets available worldwide. The perfectly diver-
sified portfolio is the best one to be held by risk averse individuals, if future shocks are unpredictable,
but it is likely not what we would observe in practice. “Local portfolio” is the other extreme, where
households mainly own the stock of the region they live in. The regions that have a surplus of initial
assets over their respective capital stock value are assumed to have invested this difference into a
perfectly diversified portfolio.
First of all, Table 2 shows that the positive welfare effects in the supported regions are stronger
under the subsidy scenarios than under the transfer scenarios. One source of these positive effects,
compared to the transfer scenarios, are the diversity gains (due to the Dixit-Stiglitz structure of
the demand for tradable goods). Another channel is the labour market, where the wages are driven
up as a reaction to more production activity using the subsidised capital. However, the subsidy is
more expensive for the donor countries like Germany. In general, the donor regions, which have low
subsidy rates but co-finance subsidies to other regions through taxes, show negative welfare effects.
An interesting observation is that under the conditions of a global portfolio the effects for the
supported regions are stronger than under the conditions of a local portfolio (Table 2), on average,
15% higher. Why is that? Figure 1 (middle right panel) nicely reveals the mechanism. The subsidy
lets the market value of capital drop. This is an effect that matters in quantitative terms. It is
important here to distinguish investment subsidies from subsidising user costs of capital. The latter
benefit all capital owners, those owning the existing stock as well as those investing in new stocks.
The former harms owners of existing stock who are facing new competition. While regional workers
own the complementary factor, capital owners own a competing factor which becomes more abundant
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due to lower cost of investment. Thus, when households own the local capital stock which loses value
due to the subsidy, their welfare gains are reduced. Also, the welfare losses in the donor regions are
lower in the case of global asset ownership.
In Table 3, the relative welfare effects are converted into Euro values. The results suggest that
under the conditions of global asset ownership, the investment subsidy has a positive net effect on the
EU as a whole. However, based on the sensitivity analysis employing alternative subsidy schemes, we
found that this effect only holds true if the economic size of the supported regions is small enough.
For the subsidy under the conditions of a local portfolio the net effect on the EU is negative, and for
the both transfer scenarios, it is close to zero.
The rest of the world experiences negative effects under the subsidy scenarios (which are though
small in relative terms, but are large in absolute terms, as Table 3 illustrates). The reason for this
is the relocation of investment towards the supported regions in the EU. Under the assumption of
global capital markets, the new investments in the rest of the world go down, there is a reduction in
capital stock and output in comparison to the benchmark steady state. Temporarily, consumption
reduces (in favour of investment in the EU) and the trade surplus increases (due to exports to the
EU). Overall, this leads to a cost in terms of global efficiency. In contrast, the transfer scenarios are
welfare-neutral for the rest of the world.
The impact of the diversity gains is demonstrated by including results from an alternative model
setup, in which the endogenous variety effect à la Dixit-Stiglitz is switched off. This is done
by fixing product diversity of tradables supply in each region at their respective benchmark levels
in the equations (11) and (13). This then resembles a classical Armington (1969) assumption for
trade in heterogeneous goods. Table 4 shows that in the subsidy scenarios the welfare gains for the
supported regions shrink slightly. The diversity gains for the supported regions are thus visible, but
amount to only 0.1-0.2 per mill in terms of the relative equivalent variation in consumption. Under
the conditions of a local portfolio, this small change however makes households better off with a
transfer than with a subsidy (last two columns of Table 4 ). For the donor regions, diversity gains
seem to compensate a small part of the welfare costs of the subsidy. For the transfer scenarios, the
diversity gains virtually do not play a role.
What can be inferred on the effectiveness of the investment subsidy as a policy instrument from
our results? Table 3 compares the nominal values of the welfare gains and the respective EU funds
in the first year of the simulation period. Overall, one can see that the regional welfare effects of the
subsidy scenario with a global portfolio (column 3) come very close to the size of the funds (column
2). In some cases, the welfare impacts are even somewhat higher (e.g. in Bulgaria and Romania).
For the other scenarios, the welfare effects are clearly bellow the value of the funds. The latter result
is consistent with the classical argument on the dead-weight loss imposed by a market intervention.
A final point refers to the robustness of the modelling results with regard to alternative aggrega-
tion schemes. Table 5 shows the results for Aggregation 2 (with disaggregated regions in Bulgaria
and Romania). We can now compare the results from different model runs. In the bottom part of
Table 3, we report the sum over the absolute effects for the Polish regions. The values only negligibly
deviate from the results for Poland as a single region in Table 5 (region 19). The same is true for the
disaggregated (Table 5) and aggregated (Table 3) versions of Bulgaria and Romania. The results for
single-region countries like Latvia or Germany or for the whole world in both simulations are also
virtually the same. This demonstrates the robustness of the model.
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8. Conclusions
This paper applied a multiregional dynamic model to study the regional welfare impacts of invest-
ment subsidies. First, regarding the methodology, the paper shows that a fully consistent neoclassical
model with forward looking agents can well be implemented and solved, and that it is a useful tool in
policy analysis in general and in the study of investment subsidies in particular. We show that this
model is robust to various regional aggregation settings, although the maximum number of regions
is currently limited.
Second, as to the policy issue raised in the beginning, we see that investment subsidies are effective
in that the supported regions enjoy welfare gains. The size of the welfare effects however depends
on the portfolio distribution held by the households. If households own diversified portfolios, we
find that the supported regions gain roughly the amounts that are allocated to them in the form
of investment subsidies. If they only own local stocks and are the only owners of the local stocks,
a part of the money is lost through the drop in share prices. This capital devaluation effect of the
investment subsidy has not been described in the literature so far. The diversity gains generated
by the model structure are small, but they are enough to make households in the supported regions
better off under the subsidy than under the lump sum transfer.
Third, from the point of view of total welfare, the subsidy is not efficient. It can lead to a welfare
loss for the EU as a whole and definitely leads to welfare losses in the rest of the world, from where
investment flows to the supported EU regions. The inefficiency is higher in the setting without the
diversity effects.
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Figure 1: Time paths of key variables in the subsidy scenario (with a local portfolio)
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Figure 2: Trade balance and consumption in the transfer scenario (with a local portfolio)
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Region Subsidy rate
Γr, per mill
Global portfolio Local portfolio
Subs Lump Subs Lump
1. Lódzkie 8.64 3.38 2.88 2.95 2.89
2. Mazowieckie 4.90 1.69 1.43 1.47 1.44
3. Malopolskie 9.62 3.83 3.25 3.34 3.25
4. Slaskie 6.38 2.36 2.00 2.07 2.01
5. Lubelskie 9.50 3.79 3.23 3.30 3.22
6. Podkarpackie 15.14 6.31 5.39 5.57 5.41
7. Swietokrzyskie 10.19 4.08 3.47 3.59 3.49
8. Podlaskie 14.03 5.81 4.97 5.10 4.97
9. Wielkopolskie 6.23 2.30 1.95 1.99 1.95
10. Zachodniopomorskie 7.81 2.98 2.56 2.57 2.56
11. Lubuskie 7.41 2.80 2.40 2.43 2.41
12. Dolnoslaskie 6.00 2.19 1.86 1.91 1.86
13. Opolskie 12.14 4.94 4.23 4.32 4.25
14. Kujawsko-Pomorskie 7.83 3.01 2.57 2.62 2.57
15. Warminsko-Mazurskie 11.01 4.43 3.80 3.88 3.80
16. Pomorskie 5.65 2.02 1.72 1.75 1.72
17. Estonia 8.42 3.11 2.67 2.71 2.67
18. Latvia 14.68 5.68 4.86 4.99 4.87
19. Lithuania 7.48 2.46 2.09 2.15 2.09
20. Germany 0.70 -0.23 -0.22 -0.24 -0.22
21. Rest East EU 5.34 2.01 1.70 1.73 1.71
22. Bulgaria, Romania 4.76 1.58 1.33 1.37 1.33
23. Rest of the EU 0.79 -0.16 -0.17 -0.18 -0.17
24. Balkan states and Turkey -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.00
25. Rest of Europe -0.07 0.00 -0.06 0.00
26. Rest of the world -0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.00
Table 2: Relative equivalent variation in consumption and investment subsidy rate, per mill (Aggregation 1)
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Region Transfer
value, Ωrt
Global portfolio Local portfolio
Subs Lump Subs Lump
1. Lódzkie 58 60 51 52 51
2. Mazowieckie 121 109 92 95 93
3. Malopolskie 79 83 70 72 70
4. Slaskie 91 89 75 78 76
5. Lubelskie 40 42 36 37 36
6. Podkarpackie 62 68 58 60 58
7. Swietokrzyskie 28 29 25 26 25
8. Podlaskie 35 38 32 33 32
9. Wielkopolskie 64 62 53 54 53
10. Zachodniopomorskie 33 33 28 28 28
11. Lubuskie 18 18 15 15 15
12. Dolnoslaskie 57 54 46 47 46
13. Opolskie 28 30 26 26 26
14. Kujawsko-Pomorskie 39 39 33 34 33
15. Warminsko-Mazurskie 33 35 30 31 30
16. Pomorskie 35 33 28 29 28
17. Estonia 41 42 36 36 36
18. Latvia 88 96 82 84 82
19. Lithuania 68 69 58 60 58
20. Germany 546 -404 -399 -432 -399
21. Rest East EU 645 599 508 517 509
22. Bulgaria, Romania 239 215 181 187 182
23. Rest of the EU 2162 -1139 -1161 -1282 -1164
24. Balkan states and Turkey -22 -1 -8 0
25. Rest of Europe -92 0 -85 0
26. Rest of the world -1241 2 -849 0
Poland total 820 821 699 717 701
East EU 1902 1842 1565 1601 1568
West EU 2708 -1544 -1560 -1715 -1563
All EU 4610 299 5 -114 5
World total 4610 -1056 6 -1055 6
Table 3: EV results of Table 2 transformed to absolute amounts at t = 0 and transfers at t = 0, million Euro
(Aggregation 1)
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Region
Global portfolio Local portfolio
Subs Lump Subs Lump
1. Lódzkie 58 51 50 52
2. Mazowieckie 105 93 91 94
3. Malopolskie 80 71 70 72
4. Slaskie 86 76 74 76
5. Lubelskie 40 36 35 36
6. Podkarpackie 66 59 58 59
7. Swietokrzyskie 28 25 25 25
8. Podlaskie 36 32 32 33
9. Wielkopolskie 60 53 51 53
10. Zachodniopomorskie 31 28 27 28
11. Lubuskie 17 15 15 15
12. Dolnoslaskie 52 47 45 47
13. Opolskie 29 26 25 26
14. Kujawsko-Pomorskie 38 34 32 34
15. Warminsko-Mazurskie 34 30 29 30
16. Pomorskie 32 28 27 28
17. Estonia 39 36 35 35
18. Latvia 93 83 81 83
19. Lithuania 66 59 57 59
20. Germany -428 -403 -458 -404
21. Rest East EU 576 513 492 515
22. Bulgaria, Romania 207 183 177 184
23. Rest of the EU -1235 -1172 -1386 -1178
24. Balkan states and Turkey -21 0 -7 0
25. Rest of Europe -87 0 -80 0
26. Rest of the world -1190 1 -785 0
East EU 1773 1580 1529 1586
West EU -1664 -1575 -1844 -1581
All EU 110 4 -314 5
World -1188 5 -1187 5
Table 4: Equivalent variation results transformed to absolute amounts at t = 0, million Euro (Aggregation 1, no
variety effect)
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Region
Global portfolio Local portfolio
Subs Lump Subs Lump
1. Severozapaden 4 3 3 3
2. Severen tsentralen 7 6 6 6
3. Severoiztochen 3 3 3 3
4. Yugoiztochen 7 6 6 6
5. Yugozapaden 16 13 13 13
6. Yuzhen tsentralen 14 12 13 12
7. Nord-Vest 30 25 26 26
8. Centru 28 24 25 24
9. Nord-Est 23 19 20 19
10. Sud-Est 9 7 7 7
11. Sud - Muntenia 26 22 22 22
12. Bucuresti - Ilfov 20 16 17 17
13. Sud-Vest Oltenia 17 15 15 15
14. Vest 12 10 10 10
15. Greece, Cyprus 247 208 216 210
16. Estonia 42 36 36 36
17. Latvia 96 82 84 82
18. Lithuania 68 58 60 58
19. Poland 823 697 719 699
20. Germany -404 -399 -433 -399
21. Rest East EU 599 508 516 508
22. Rest West EU -1390 -1370 -1499 -1374
23. Balkan and Turkey -22 0 -8 0
24. Rest of Europe -92 0 -85 0
25. Rest of the world -1240 2 -849 1
Bulgaria, Romania 215 182 187 182
East and South-East EU 2091 1771 1818 1776
West EU -1794 -1770 -1932 -1773
All EU 297 2 -114 2
World -1057 3 -1056 3
Table 5: Equivalent variation results transformed to absolute amounts at t = 0, million Euro (Aggregation 2)
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